Why England will NEVER win a major tournament - until they do the following things... Part 1: Tactics and formation

Last night, as our nation's football team subsided to a shambolic defeat in Zagreb, something strange seemed to be happening. On the radio phone-in I listened to, and on messageboards I've browsed since, more and more England fans seemed to have reached the depressing conclusion that actually, we're nowhere near as good as we think we are. The hype about our 'golden generation' of 'world class' players is, plainly, just hype - for England have produced roughly one impressive performance a year for the past 5 years, and all too often, bear the appearance of a bewildered rabble, fumbling around while being outplayed, out-thought and even out-fought.

And - perish the thought - Sven-Goran Eriksson didn't 'underachieve' with the players he had at his disposal at all: actually, given our obvious lack of technical ability, and the improvement of more and more nations previously thought of as little more than cannon-fodder, three consecutive quarter-final exits represented not just par, but perhaps even slight over-achievement.

This certainly wasn't a demonstration of the fabled arrogance and over-expectation of which England fans are so often accused: quite the opposite, in fact. So, are they right? Should we just accept our lot as eternal quarter-finalists, and leave the game's true powers to get on with it as we disappear stage left at the business end of major tournaments?

In my view, no - but there are a number of huge factors which must be addressed if England are ever to add to that solitary major trophy of forty long years ago. These factors are often underestimated, still more disputed, by fans, players and journalists alike: but if anything, the culture of excuses adopted by pundits, and the culture of blaming the manager adopted by fans and journalists, is really part of the problem: it's simplistic and short-termist. In truth, England's difficulties are an awful lot more complex and deep-rooted - but there's no question they can be successfully overcome, as long as there is the will to do so. Over the next few weeks, I'll be outlining my opinions of these problems, and suggesting solutions - and as ever, would hugely appreciate the input of all those who share with me a desperate desire to see England playing well, fulfilling their potential, and making the country feel proud of its football team again.

First up today, it's formation. Predictably, Steve McClaren has been almost universally derided (not least by Alan Hansen and Alan Shearer on Match of the Day) for adopting the alien 3-5-2 system last night. 4-4-2, we are told, is what English players are used to - so how can we abandon it before such a difficult game? But the thing is, if 3-5-2 is an outmoded, failed system, then so - whenever England use it, at least - is 4-4-2. As far back as sixteen years ago, John Barnes, Chris Waddle and Gary Lineker were all telling Pete Davies (author of the timeless 'All Played Out', which remains for my money the best book ever written about football, and light years ahead of 'Fever Pitch') of the problems 4-4-2 caused: that two rigid banks of four led to no creativity, no movement, and worse, England being overrun by technically superior teams in midfield. This invariably forced the team backwards, resulting in Barnes and Waddle abandoning their roles higher up the field to help out the defence - and consequently, the team posed increasingly little offensive threat.

Bobby Robson switched to 3-5-2 because he saw it as more defensive: an essential measure needed to counter the threat posed by European Champions, Holland at our second game at Italia 90. But funnily enough, by shoring up the defence, the whole team was suddenly far more confident and robust: and what could at times be almost a 5-4-1 recoiled instantly into attacking 3-5-2, with the Dutch players (in a position wholly unaccustomed to them) finding themselves outpaced and overrun. In short, England suddenly looked like a contemporary international team - and although there were many hairy moments in the knockout stages against Belgium and Cameroon, it simply cannot be a coincidence that we went on to enjoy our finest-ever World Cup on foreign soil after ditching (or at least, ditching our obsession with) 4-4-2.

And with football far more based on pace and fitness than it was then, if anything, England's deficiencies have shown up all the more whenever we've played 4-4-2 at major tournaments since. Portugal and Romania at Euro 2000 stand out as particular humiliations: with the Portugese substitutes on the touchline openly laughing at the poverty of England's tactics. The likes of Adams, Ince, Beckham, McManaman and Scholes unquestionably gave their all at that tournament - but if anything, the real miracle was that, thanks to their passion and pride, we came within a minute of qualifying for the quarter-finals. For they were betrayed by a woefully inept manager, and a system which, whenever England adopt it, simply does not work.

Sven-Goran Eriksson was certainly a vast improvement on Kevin Keegan - but before long, the complaints about our long ball game, chronic lack of creativity, inability to keep the ball, and tendency to sit deeper and deeper when protecting a lead, had started. Against Portugal at Euro 2004, England managed sixteen shots on target to their thirty-five: once again, the miracle was that we came so close to going through at all. But that we were so utterly outplayed should hardly have come as a surprise: for Portugal, a technically better side than us anyway, flooded the midfield - leaving our strikers isolated too high up the pitch, and our defence under more and more pressure. And whereas any footballer will tell you that he never feels tired when in possession, continually trying to win the ball back is an exhausting experience - which probably explains why poor Frank Lampard looked a virtual skeleton by the end of extra-time, so much running had he been forced to do.

It's not the fitness of English players which is at fault: it's the system which they're forced to play. And given the fact that, like their contemporaries from the rest of Britain, Scandinavia and Germany, our footballers plainly lack the technical abilities of their counterparts from hotter climates, it's frankly preposterous that we continually play in a formation which leaves us a man short in midfield against dynamic, flexible sides like Portugal, Argentina or Holland. The reason our defenders are so often forced into booting it aimlessly long is because our midfield is so often outnumbered: the consequences, as we saw all too often in Germany in the summer, being the ball coming straight back at us and tiring us out more and more.

Of course, even McClaren seems to have understood this: hence his change last night. But actually, he didn't play 3-5-2 at all: he played a ludicrously cautious 5-3-2, which if anything, meant we were on occasion more undermanned than ever. 3-5-2 demands two dynamic, attack-minded wing backs - or even, once properly practiced, and the team has become more accomplished, pure wide midfield players - and ideally, a libero to sweep up behind, too. Mark Wright performed such a role expertly at Italia 90, and Rio Ferdinand is perfectly equipped to do the same now; but if it's as part of a flat back five, with a right back and left back far too defensively minded to get properly forward, and three central defenders all going for the same ball, it's hardly surprising the team looked so confused, is it?

It's also strange how all those commentators who frequently describe 3-5-2 as a discredited relic of the past ignore the constant success Guus Hiddink has enjoyed with it. Hiddink, of course, has done a magnificent job with Holland, South Korea and Australia - and frankly, given most of the Australians share exactly the same technical limitations as their English counterparts, if he can make the green-and-golds look so comfortable with it, then England are perfectly equipped to succeed with it too.

Above all, though, the emphasis must be on getting away from our traditional, direct, predictable way of playing, and especially on abandoning, once and for all, 4-4-2. It can get you to quarter-finals, certainly - but a simple glance in the history books reveals a constant glass ceiling for sides playing this 'British' style whenever they ran into more technically accomplished opposition. Not only England, but the best sides ever to emerge from Wales, Ireland (north and south) and Scandinavia, have almost always found themselves escorted to the exit door when quarter-final time arrived. The only side in living memory to buck this trend were Sweden at USA 94: largely because they got lucky with the draw, and didn't have to face a genuine power until the semis, where Brazil stopped them in their tracks, and the Swedes hardly mustered a shot in anger.

Moreover, England's lack of technical expertise already makes it especially difficult to succeed in hot weather at tournaments played in summer months: put simply, given our temperate climate, most English footballers have little or no experience of playing in such conditions. Which is yet another argument against 4-4-2: high tempo, direct football cannot possibly work against the most accomplished sides in the world in stifling heat. Yet that is what we constantly expect England to do - and once again, it cannot be a coincidence that all our games at Italia 90 were played in cooler, evening conditions - just as our best performances at Euro 96 were produced at night too.

It doesn't have to be 3-5-2: the key is to choose the best system given the players available, and above all, to ensure the midfield is never left outnumbered or exposed. So the 4-5-1/4-3-3 which is all the vogue in the Premiership is a perfectly realistic alternative too (provided genuine attacking wingers are deployed on the flanks, and that the lone striker is, unlike Wayne Rooney, someone naturally suited to the role).

And on occasion, Terry Venables' fabled 'Christmas tree' might be still another option: another system lampooned at the time, but which was actually the key to our memorable defeat of Holland at Euro 96. Perfectly demonstrating the profound lack of tactical understanding in English football, most commentators at the time believed we beat the Dutch with 4-4-2; but not according to the man himself. Actually, by playing Teddy Sheringham in central midfield (which resulted in fans and commentators alike grumbling about him playing so deep during the first half), Venables did what Dennis Bergkamp had been doing to opposition defences for years: Sheringham drew the Dutch centre backs out, leaving their full backs hopelessly exposed by the rampaging Anderton and McManaman on the wings. England played 4-3-2-1 that glorious night; and showed that, with the right manager, and hungry, ambitious players willing to be flexible and try something different, we are just as capable of successfully implementing new systems as anyone else.

You can argue all you want about players making systems work, and not the other way around, not to mention the continued successful use of 4-4-2 by the world's top club sides. But the international game is something entirely different, at times more akin to chess than the sport English fans are used to watching every week: it requires profound levels of tactical and technical intelligence from managers and players, and a system that enables a team to make the most of its resources. And in the absence of some miracle of evolution whereby English children grow up with the same array of skills as Brazilian kids enjoy, we simply cannot continue to expect our players to succeed while in a tactical straitjacket. 4-4-2 must be ditched, immediately - for no change equals no chance.